# Chernobyl

*Tom Geraghty · Stories & Cases, Safety & Human Error*

Analyses the 1986 Chernobyl disaster as a case study in how authoritarian culture, fear of authority, and compliance-driven norms prevented operators from raising concerns. Shows how power gradients and a culture of silence turned a design flaw into catastrophe.

- **This page:** https://explore.psychsafety.com/n/chernobyl/
- **Read the full article on psychsafety.com:** https://psychsafety.com/chernobyl/
- **Interactive map:** https://explore.psychsafety.com/?node=chernobyl

## Connected concepts (8)

- [Local Rationality](https://explore.psychsafety.com/n/local-rationality.md)
- [Normalisation of Deviance (Challenger)](https://explore.psychsafety.com/n/normalisation-of-deviance.md)
- [Organizing and the Process of Sensemaking](https://explore.psychsafety.com/n/weick-sutcliffe-obstfeld-2005.md) (paper)
- [Typologies of Power](https://explore.psychsafety.com/n/typologies-of-power.md)
- [Blametropism](https://explore.psychsafety.com/n/blametropism.md)
- [Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascos](https://explore.psychsafety.com/n/janis-1982.md) (paper)
- [Just Culture](https://explore.psychsafety.com/n/just-culture.md)
- [The Dark Side of Organizations: Mistake, Misconduct, and Disaster](https://explore.psychsafety.com/n/vaughan-1999.md) (paper)