# Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling. Report to the President

**Oil Spill Commission (2011) · Compartmentalised warnings at Macondo**

*Oil Spill Commission · Case Study · Safety & Error, Voice & Silence, Culture & Context · Report to the President · 2011 · Open access*

The presidential Commission on the Deepwater Horizon disaster concludes that the loss of BP's Macondo well 'could have been prevented', and that the mistakes of BP, Halliburton and Transocean 'reveal such systematic failures in risk management that they place in doubt the safety culture of the entire industry'. Transocean's rig exploded on 20 April 2010. Eleven men died and 16 or 17 were injured, on its differing counts; it puts the spill at 'more than four million barrels' in its Foreword and roughly 4.9 million, by government estimate, later.

Most failures, it finds, 'can be traced back to underlying failures of management and communication'. Information 'appears to have been excessively compartmentalized'. The Commission does not believe Halliburton reported an unstable cement test to BP; the cement job's difficulties were mostly not passed to the rig crew; and on Transocean's account warnings written after a similar near-miss four months earlier never reached it. On the negative-pressure test it appears the men 'started from the assumption that the well could not be flowing', and BP had, or enforced, no policy requiring a call to shore. Government reports put the well's budget at $96.2 million and 51 days; by 20 April it was 'almost six weeks behind schedule and more than $58 million over budget'. Many risk-raising decisions saved time, yet the Commission 'cannot say whether any person' consciously chose a riskier alternative to save money.

Four BP and Transocean executives were aboard that day on a 'management visibility tour', and the crew had not had a single 'lost-time incident' in seven years of drilling. A survey done at Transocean's request weeks earlier, which the endnotes source to Lloyd's Register, found the rig 'relatively strong in many of the core aspects of safety management', while 46 per cent of crew surveyed 'felt that some of the workforce feared reprisals for reporting unsafe situations'. The Commission says only that this 'hints at the organizational roots of the problem'. Of BP's Texas City refinery it quotes the Chemical Safety Board: 'Reporting bad news was not encouraged'.

The Minerals Management Service both regulated drilling and collected its revenue, and was 'systematically lacking the resources, technical training, or experience in petroleum engineering' the work needed. The Commission recommends an independent safety agency within the Interior Department, reporting of near misses, whistleblower protection for offshore workers, and an industry safety institute apart from the American Petroleum Institute. Its chief counsel's investigation lacked subpoena power.

The report does not name psychological safety. The bridge is ours: we read the warnings that did not travel between or within the companies, the test apparently not referred to shore and the reported fear of reprisals as its evidence on voice.

- **Citation:** National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling (2011) Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling. Report to the President. January 2011. ISBN 978-0-16-087371-3.
- **This page:** https://explore.psychsafety.com/n/oil-spill-commission-2011/
- **View the source paper:** https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO-OILCOMMISSION.pdf
- **Interactive map:** https://explore.psychsafety.com/?mode=papers&node=oil-spill-commission-2011

## Neighbours (9)

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- [Learning from the Piper Alpha Accident: A Postmortem Analysis of Technical and Organizational Factors](https://explore.psychsafety.com/n/pate-cornell-1993.md) (paper)
- [Thinking About Process Safety Indicators](https://explore.psychsafety.com/n/hopkins-2009.md) (paper)
- [The Deepwater Horizon Explosion: Non-Technical Skills, Safety Culture, and System Complexity](https://explore.psychsafety.com/n/reader-oconnor-2014.md) (paper)
- [Amplifying Weak Signals](https://explore.psychsafety.com/n/amplifying-weak-signals.md)
- [Learning from Incidents](https://explore.psychsafety.com/n/psychological-safety-85-learning-from-incidents.md)
- [Normal Accidents](https://explore.psychsafety.com/n/normal-accidents.md)
- [Sharp & Blunt End](https://explore.psychsafety.com/n/the-sharp-end-blunt-end-of-education.md)
- [Whistleblowing & PS](https://explore.psychsafety.com/n/whistleblowing-and-psychological-safety.md)
