Profiles in Patient Safety: Authority Gradients in Medical Error
Cosby & Croskerry (2004) · Overruled resident, discharged child
Cosby and Croskerry apply the authority gradient, a term they say 'was first defined in aviation', to medicine and medical training through one emergency department case. A resident saw a child with a varicella-like illness who appeared more ill than expected, one lesion's necrotic edge suggesting a deep soft-tissue infection. Twice the attending physician judged the illness routine and told him to discharge the child. He stalled, hoping to consult another attending at the change of shift, but had to leave for other duties; the child was discharged and died that night at another hospital, of varicella complicated by streptococcal fasciitis. They hold that both physicians 'were acting appropriately for their respective roles': residents' role is to detect and warn of any potential life-threatening condition, attendings held accountable for flow and efficiency.
They credit the Institute of Medicine report To Err Is Human with introducing the concept to medicine, while little has been written on its role in medical error. Their examples run from Tenerife and Challenger to helicopter cockpits, where, citing Alkov et al (1992), mishap rates rise when officers of different ranks share the cockpit. They add, without citing a source, that as many as 40% of junior-ranking copilots reported failing to relay significant doubts about safety. In medicine they cite a fatal intrathecal vincristine injection given by a junior resident against his own judgement, under pressure from a senior physician, and a wrong-site hemivulvectomy done at an attending surgeon's redirection, and suggest that the relative dearth of published reports acknowledging the gradient's role 'may represent an authority gradient effect'.
Looking also outside medicine, they set out remedies: crew resource management's escalation from a question to 'I'm worried' to a direct challenge; a proposed mandatory second opinion from an independent senior physician whenever significant disputes occur; an attending who overrules a resident on a serious life threat offering at least 'a cogent argument'; and senior clinicians narrating their own errors, 'bridging the gradient'. Some obedience is necessary, they write, but it 'should never become blind'.
The article presents one case and a series of examples, not new data. They acknowledge that most medical errors arise from many human and system factors; in this case a peak season of viral illness brought high volume and acuity, and inadequate staffing, disorganised teamwork and limited support systems all contributed to a tendency to discharge patients prematurely, and they put system design ahead of awareness of gradients.
The paper does not name psychological safety. The bridge is ours: we read its warning that without a formal method to settle disputes residents and students 'may be less likely to speak up when they believe a patient is at risk' as an account of voice across a gradient.
Save this paper to a bibliography, keep notes on it, and export citations. Create a free account →
Related psychsafety.com articles (5)
- Crew Resource Mgmt
- Psychological Safety in Healthcare
- Reducing Power Gradients
- Leadership in Healthcare (CRM)
- PACE Assertiveness
Related papers (3)
- Vaughan (1996): The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA
- Schröder-Hinrichs et al (2012): From Titanic to Costa Concordia — a Century of Lessons Not Learned
- Sexton, Thomas & Helmreich (2000): Error, stress, and teamwork in medicine and aviation: cross sectional surveys
