Rankings and Reactivity: How Public Measures Recreate Social Worlds
Espeland & Sauder (2007) · Reactivity: two mechanisms, three effects
Espeland and Sauder argue that public measures are reactive: 'Measures elicit responses from people who intervene in the objects they measure.' Reactivity, the idea that people change their behaviour in reaction to being evaluated, observed or measured, is usually depicted in sociology as a methodological problem; they use it as a lens on how public measures change institutions.
Their case is the U.S. News and World Report ranking of law schools. The primary data are 136 open-ended interviews with administrators, faculty and staff, including representatives of 70 of approximately 190 accredited US law schools, seven of which they visited. Respondents were not asked identical questions, so the frequency of a response is 'only an approximate indication' of its importance.
Their framework separates mechanisms from effects. Of two mechanisms, self-fulfilling prophecy works through expectations: small differences in rank affect applications and yield (Sauder and Lancaster 2006), past rankings may influence the reputation ratings that feed the next ranking, and schools are encouraged 'to become more like what rankings measure'. Commensuration, 'the transformation of qualities into quantities that share a metric', works mainly on cognition: it simplifies, strips context and diverts attention from what is not ranked.
Three effects follow. Schools reallocate resources to optimise their rank, for example into merit scholarships. Work is redefined: all 16 respondents in career services described much greater effort spent on learning graduates' employment status. And schools game, 'manipulating rules and numbers in ways that are unconnected to, or even undermine, the motivation behind them': in 1995 the magazine listed 29 of 177 schools that had reported higher median test scores to it than to their accrediting body.
Their account depicts the effects as 'serious and mostly harmful'. Interviewees were reluctant to admit gaming at their current schools. The framework is offered as 'an orienting heuristic', not a general theory, and, citing Meyer, they note that firms can simply revise measures that produce gaming. Public measures, they write, create a chronic tension 'between taming reactivity and producing it'; they quote Strathern: 'When a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure.'
The paper does not name psychological safety; the bridge is ours. Its evidence is a ranking imposed on organisations from outside, not a survey inside one, but we read it as a caution for any psychological safety score that is published and compared between teams.
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