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Dyads and Triads at 35,000 Feet: Factors Affecting Group Process and Aircrew Performance

Foushee (1984) · Captainitis and copilot reluctance

Foushee · Review & Meta-analysis · Voice & Silence, Safety & Error, Power & Equity · American Psychologist · 1984 · Open access

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Foushee argues that the redundancy built into multi-pilot cockpits has failed too often because captains have not heeded the warnings of other crewmembers, and has also failed because crewmembers who had adequate information have, for some reason, not provided it. Citing a review of jet transport accidents from 1968 to 1976 that found more than 60 in which crew performance breakdowns played a significant role, he applies Hackman and Morris's input, process and outcome model to the flight deck: personality or interpersonal styles of leadership as inputs, communication and crew coordination as process, and errors, incidents and accidents as outcomes, with the emphasis on process.

The paper is a review, drawing on confidential incident reports, NTSB accident reports and simulator studies. In one report a captain told the copilot to 'just look out the damn window'; in another a copilot blamed 'a bad habit that I think a lot of copilots have of double-checking everything before we say anything to the captain'. Foushee warns that subordinates can become 'conditioned' not to speak up, and cites a simulator study by Harper, Kidera and Cullen in which captains feigned subtle incapacitation and about a quarter of the flights hit the ground because first officers did not take control.

In Ruffell Smith's Boeing 747 simulation, he reports, the majority of problems were related to breakdowns in crew coordination rather than a lack of technical knowledge and skill. His reanalysis with Manos of its cockpit voice recordings found that crews who communicated less tended not to perform as well, but that the type of communication mattered more: acknowledgements went with fewer errors overall, and crews that made more errors showed more frustration or anger and embarrassment, and less agreement. He notes that these correlational data do not allow inferences of causation, and that the simulations' high workload, infrequent in day to day operations, no doubt contributed to the problems found.

He then reviews the cockpit resource management training some airlines were beginning, under Hackman and Morris's three levers: norms, through videotape feedback and seminars, by which what some call 'captainitis' may begin to subside; the training task, through Line-Oriented Flight Training; and composition, through selection, which has obvious near-term drawbacks. He records a 1952 airline guideline that the first officer should not correct the captain's errors, and concludes that it was not yet known whether the programmes would bring meaningful or long-lasting benefits, though better knowledge of these issues is a step in the right direction.

The paper does not name psychological safety. The bridge is ours: we read his case for a strong group norm of shared responsibility, and his stress on leadership styles that encourage the input of all team members, as an early statement that whether juniors speak depends on the norms captains and crews build.

Foushee, H.C. (1984) 'Dyads and triads at 35,000 feet: factors affecting group process and aircrew performance', American Psychologist, 39(8), pp. 885–893.

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