Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing
Fricker (2007) · Wronged as a knower
Fricker argues that there is a distinctively epistemic kind of injustice: a wrong done to someone 'specifically in their capacity as a knower'. The Introduction names two forms. Testimonial injustice 'occurs when prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker's word'. Hermeneutical injustice occurs at a prior stage, 'when a gap in collective interpretive resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense of their social experiences'. Her examples: 'the police do not believe you because you are black', and 'you suffer sexual harassment in a culture that still lacks that critical concept'.
In the Introduction's summary of the chapters, the central case of testimonial injustice is 'identity-prejudicial credibility deficit', identity prejudice being her label for prejudices against people 'qua social type'. Such prejudice, she suggests, typically enters a hearer's judgement through a stereotype, 'often despite, rather than because of, their beliefs'.
Hermeneutical injustice, the Introduction says, is not perpetrated by individuals. The disadvantage falls unequally because members of the group the gap most disadvantages are, 'in some degree, hermeneutically marginalized': 'they participate unequally in the practices through which social meanings are generated'. This can mean, she says, that their experiences are left ill-understood, 'perhaps even by the subjects themselves', and/or their attempts to communicate 'are not heard as rational' because their expressive style is inadequately understood.
Against each injustice Fricker sets a virtue of the hearer, which the Introduction calls hybrid, 'both intellectual and ethical'. In testimonial justice the influence of identity prejudice on a credibility judgement 'is detected and corrected for'. In hermeneutical justice the hearer is alert to the possibility that a speaker's relative unintelligibility is a function of 'a collective hermeneutical impoverishment'. She states the limit herself: where the root cause is 'structures of unequal power', eradicating these injustices would take 'not just more virtuous hearers, but collective social political change'. The Conclusion says that, 'by implication', the account lays a foundation for a conception of corresponding institutional virtues, employers among its examples.
This is a work of philosophy. The bridge to psychological safety is ours. We read the two injustices as lying either side of speaking up: a person may speak and be given less credibility because of who they are, or may share with their hearers no concept for what has happened to them. On that reading, whether people feel able to speak does not settle how their word is received.
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