Evaluating Deviations and Considerations in Daily Practice When Double-Checking High-Risk Medication Administration: A Qualitative Study Using the FRAM
van Stralen et al (2024) · Double-check by risk-assessment
Van Stralen, van Eikenhorst, Vonk, Schutijser and Wagner asked how nurses on Dutch hospital wards double-check high-risk medication, and what they weigh when they depart from the guideline that a second nurse check it independently at the bedside. Their Safety-II starting point: compliance with the double-check is low, yet most administrations pass without incident, indicating that nurses adapt.
They interviewed 77 nurses on ten intensive care, surgical and internal medicine wards in nine hospitals, online for about 30 minutes each between June 2020 and June 2021, as COVID-19 measures prevented observation. Each ward's contact person chose the nurses, asked to pick ones with different views. With the Functional Resonance Analysis Method they set a work-as-imagined model from the Dutch guidelines against a work-as-done model from the interviews, and coded reasons for deviating against Hollnagel's work related ETTO rules.
They found six deviations between the models. At administration the double-check took four forms: at the bedside as described, though nurses shared information to speed it up; not at all; after the event, up to 30 minutes later; or only at shift change. On eight of ten wards nurses ran a risk-assessment, sometimes subconsciously, weighing patient complexity, the type of medication, their familiarity with it, the administration path, the difficulty of calculations and whether a colleague was free. Time pressure was the factor they call most important.
Among further considerations they class as subconscious, the most mentioned ETTO rule was 'deviation due to time pressure' and the second 'deviating out of habit'. 'Trust in own expertise' and 'trust in the expertise of a colleague' were other high scoring rules, which they say suggests nurses found themselves or their colleagues capable enough to go without the check. The abstract names trusting their own or colleagues' expertise as its example of these subconscious reasonings. No counts are given, none of the quoted nurses speaks of trust, and the interview guide did not ask about it. The dominant rules differed by ward, which they say may suggest the influence of ward culture.
Even at the bedside, the check was not independent: shared information made it what they call, citing earlier work, a 'primed double-check', which that work links to errors going undetected through confirmation bias. Their highlights state that the findings showed the double-check guidelines are not feasible in daily practice. In the discussion they ask, citing other work, whether an independent check is feasible, and whether it needs to be achieved, and propose that future research use the FRAM insights to make ward-specific changes. They relied wholly on nurses' accounts, which may omit unconscious actions.
The paper does not mention psychological safety. The bridge is ours: we read trust in a colleague's expertise as one reason a second check was set aside here, ranked below time pressure and habit, and reported without numbers.
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