The Collapse of Sensemaking in Organizations: The Mann Gulch Disaster

Weick · Safety & Error, Team Learning · Administrative Science Quarterly · 1993 · Open access

Analysis of the 1949 Mann Gulch fire in which 13 smokejumpers died, treated as a case study in the collapse of sensemaking and role structure under extreme conditions. Proposes four sources of organisational resilience — improvisation, virtual role systems, the attitude of wisdom, and respectful interaction — that can forestall disintegration when structure fails. A foundational text for understanding how organisations fall apart under pressure.

Weick, K.E. (1993) 'The collapse of sensemaking in organizations: The Mann Gulch disaster', Administrative Science Quarterly, 38(4), pp. 628–652.

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