Collective Mind in Organizations: Heedful Interrelating on Flight Decks

Weick & Roberts · Team Learning · Administrative Science Quarterly · 1993 · Paywalled

Introduced 'collective mind' — the way groups develop heedful interrelating, a form of attentive, connected action that makes complex systems reliable. Based on naval flight deck operations. Argues that reliability is a social achievement, not a technical one, and that heedfulness — attending carefully to others' contributions — is what prevents catastrophic failure.

Weick, K.E. and Roberts, K.H. (1993) 'Collective mind in organizations: Heedful interrelating on flight decks', Administrative Science Quarterly, 38(3), pp. 357–381.

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