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Safety & Learning from Disasters

A guided trail · 14 stops · through the research literature

From a Swedish warship in 1628 to the modern science of catastrophe. How the study of disaster moved from blaming components to understanding systems.

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The route

  1. Vasa Syndrome: Insights from a 17th-Century New-Product Disaster (Kessler, Bierly & Gopalakrishnan, 2001)

    Kessler, Bierly and Gopalakrishnan use the sinking of the Swedish warship Vasa, which capsized and sank within minutes of leaving harbour on its maiden voyage in 1628, as a case study in how ambitiou…

  2. Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (Perrow, 1984)

    The founding text of Normal Accident Theory, built to explain why certain systems generate catastrophic failures that no amount of operator training or safety procedure eliminates.

  3. The Vulnerable System: An Analysis of the Tenerife Air Disaster (Weick, 1990)

    Weick's analysis of the 1977 Tenerife runway collision, in which a KLM 747 began its take-off roll while a Pan Am 747 was still on the runway and 583 people died, is one of the founding texts of the…

  4. Learning from the Piper Alpha Accident: A Postmortem Analysis of Technical and Organizational Factors (Paté-Cornell, 1993)

    On the night of 6 July 1988 the offshore platform Piper Alpha caught fire in the North Sea and 167 people died, in what remains the worst disaster in the history of the offshore oil industry.

  5. The Deepwater Horizon Explosion: Non-Technical Skills, Safety Culture, and System Complexity (Reader & O'Connor, 2014)

    Reader and O'Connor take the Deepwater Horizon blowout of April 2010, which killed eleven people and produced the largest marine oil spill in history, and do what the official inquiries did not: they…

  6. Collective Mind in Organizations: Heedful Interrelating on Flight Decks (Weick, 1993)

    Introduced 'collective mind' — the way groups develop heedful interrelating, a form of attentive, connected action that makes complex systems reliable.

  7. The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA (Vaughan, 1996)

    Diane Vaughan's ten-year historical ethnography of the decision to launch the Space Shuttle Challenger in January 1986, and the origin of 'normalization of deviance', one of the most widely cited con…

  8. Human Error: Models and Management (Reason, 2000)

    The BMJ paper that brought the Swiss Cheese model and the person vs system approach to a clinical audience.

  9. The Criminalization of Human Error in Aviation and Healthcare: A Review (Dekker, 2011)

    A review of the growing phenomenon of criminal prosecution following professional mistakes in aviation and healthcare.

  10. The Safety Organizing Scale: Development and Validation of a Behavioral Measure of Safety Culture in Hospital Nursing Units (Vogus, 2007)

    Develops and validates the Safety Organizing Scale (SOS), a 9-item self-report measure of the concrete behaviours that constitute a unit-level safety culture, addressing a real gap in the prior liter…

  11. From Safety-I to Safety-II: A White Paper (Hollnagel, 2015)

    The canonical white paper articulating the Safety-I to Safety-II transition.

  12. Errors in Organizations: An Integrative Review via Level of Analysis, Temporal Dynamism, and Priority Lenses (Lei, Naveh & Novikov, 2016)

    An integrative review of the organisational-error literature (some sixty-five studies across twenty-five years) that reads error research through three lenses and, in doing so, becomes the corpus's a…

  13. Catastrophe and Systemic Change: Learning from the Grenfell Tower Fire and Other Disasters (Kernick, 2021)

    Kernick writes this book from an unusual and exacting vantage point: she lived on the twenty-first floor of Grenfell Tower from 2011 to 2014, watched it burn on 14 June 2017, and lost seven former ne…

  14. State of Science: Evolving Perspectives on 'Human Error' (Read, Shorrock, Walker & Salmon, 2021)

    Read, Shorrock, Walker and Salmon review sixty years of thinking about human error, and the arc they trace is the one this map cares about most: the slow migration from blaming the person to interrog…